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Abstract 
The final-year undergraduate dissertation is commonplace in Education Studies 
programmes across the world and yet its philosophical assumptions are complex and 
not always questioned. In England there is evidence to suggest a tacit preference for 
empiricism in textbooks designed to support early researchers. This brings, we 
suggest, problems associated with dualism, instrumentalism and of accounting for 
value, redolent of the dilemmas that emerge from Hume’s empiricist epistemology. 
The paper suggests that if argumentation were explicitly taught to undergraduates it 
may help oversee the more judicious use of empirical approaches that are currently 
privileged in dissertation guidance. 
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“Usually (but not always), there will be an expectation that the kind of 
evidence you collect during a research project you undertake at university will 
be empirical. That is to say, you will be expected to go out into the wide world 
and collect data yourself rather than relying on information marshalled by 
others – for example in a book. (In fact, a research project as a literature 
review - that is, just as a literature review - is sometimes acceptable, but if you 
want to do a research project that is based solely on the literature you should 
check with your tutor).” (Thomas, 2013: 20-2)  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The final-year undergraduate dissertation in Education Studies is a familiar 
requirement in many universities worldwide. For example, at Brown University, 
Rhode Island, students ‘seeking to graduate with honors must apply to write a Senior 
Thesis during their sixth semester’ (Brown University, 2015; see also University of 
Nebraska, 2015). So too at Portland State University, Oregon, where in ‘the final year 
of undergraduate study, Honors College students complete a thesis’ (Portland State 
University, 2015). The pattern is repeated in Europe where, at the Freie Universität, 
Berlin, undergraduates are required to ‘write a bachelor’s degree thesis, which is 
typically about 25 pages long and must be prepared within eight weeks’ (Freie 
Universität Berlin, 2015). In Scotland students seeking Honours in Primary 
Education at the University of Glasgow are expected to write ‘a research based 
dissertation… on a topic chosen by the student’ (University of Glasgow, 2015). So too 
in Malta, where the university stipulates that ‘the undergraduate dissertation is a 
compulsory component of the UoM B.Ed.(Hons.) programme’ (University of Malta, 
2015).  
 
The seeming ubiquity of the dissertation - 'independent work project', 'bachelor's 
degree thesis', 'senior thesis', 'senior project', 'honors dissertation' - in undergraduate 
Education Studies programmes is mirrored in English universities. Here it is 
common for the academic and personal benefits of dissertation-writing to be 
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emphasised insofar as it is said to present the student with the challenge and virtues 
of independent learning. Indeed, for some, the dissertation is the ‘gold standard for 
British higher education’ (Healey, 2011, p. 1. See also Walliman & Buckler, 2008). 
English universities also commonly share with other academic communities the 
requirement that students should choose between a ‘theoretical’ or an ‘empirical’ 
study. At the University of Malta, for example, students are counselled that their 
initial choice may well be misguided: ‘Contrary to popular belief amongst students, 
the dissertation does not necessarily have to include empirical research. There are 
also literature type, investigative type and project type dissertations, to mention a 
few’ (University of Malta, 2015). Glasgow reminds undergraduates that ‘although 
empirical work may be carried out, it is not essential’ (University of Glasgow, 2015), 
while at the University of Göttingen students are told: ‘There are essentially two 
different types of work, namely theoretical (also called a literature work) and 
empirical work’ (Universität Göttingen, 2015). Similarly at Waikato, in New Zealand, 
the Education Studies Dissertation module is described as: ‘A report on the findings 
of a theoretical or empirical investigation’ (University of Waikato, 2015).  
 
The argument we make in this paper is that such a choice between a ‘theoretical’ or 
‘empirical’ study is not only philosophically misleading but may entice the student 
towards the latter. We say this because, in England at least, a plethora of guidance is 
published in the form of textbooks that profess to support final-year students in their 
dissertation writing (e.g. Sharp, 2010; Thomas, 2013; Walliman & Buckler, 2008; 
Burton, Brundrett & Jones, 2008; Bell, 2005; McNiff & Whitehead, 2010). In them, 
however, we find a tendency for empiricism and encapsulated in Thomas’ dubious 
reflection that ‘usually…there will be an expectation that the kind of evidence you 
collect during a research project you undertake at university will be empirical’ 
(Thomas, 2013: 20). We argue that if Thomas is right the assumption is questionable 
and, moreover, may undermine national subject benchmarks for Education Studies 
that show there is nothing incumbent within them requiring a preference for 
empiricism (QAA, 2007. See also Taber, 2012, and our discussion below).  
 
The shape of the paper is this. First we question whether education is a science or 
humanity, a subject or discipline, merely to register some of the implications and the 
complexity this has for research within the domain. We then outline the main 
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characteristics of British empiricism through Hume and Ayer and show how their 
epistemologies set values adrift by deeming them unverifiable. This leads to our 
scrutiny of a selection of English dissertation textbooks to verify our charge of ‘tacit 
empiricism’ with them. We make clear from the outset that our goal is not to criticise 
empiricism per se and, indeed, in drawing upon evidence from English textbooks to 
demonstrate how they marginalise other forms of inquiry, we clearly employ 
empirical methods ourselves. Finally we suggest that teaching undergraduates about 
argument may help overcome some of the problems and preferences of dissertation 
guidance in England today. 
 
Empiricism and Hume’s legacy 
 
It is contestable whether Education Studies is an academic subject or a discipline. If 
viewed as a subject, greater emphasis is placed upon the contributory disciplines of 
psychology, sociology, philosophy, history and politics. If viewed as a discipline, more 
attention is drawn to ‘its own distinctive discourse and methods of enquiry’ (QAA, 
2007: §2.3). Either way – and we proffer no judgement here - epistemological 
contestation is central to education research. Empiricism, either in the early-modern 
form of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, that we talk more of below, or in its culmination 
in logical positivism in the first decades of the 20th century (see Friedman, 1999: 5), 
can no longer enjoy an uncontested position of dominance in educational research. 
Enduring challenges to empiricism include the undermining of the fact/value 
distinction (Quine, 1951), as well as from philosophers who would question that 
which is ‘added in’ during the process of interpreting experience (e.g. Rorty, 1979; 
Sellars, et al., 2003; Davidson, 2003). Thus, whereas empiricism may have once laid 
claim to being a foundational approach to epistemological truths (see Phillips & 
Burbules, 2000: 5), today it has to take its place amongst a raft of competing 
epistemologies and, at the very least, requires explication as an approach to 
knowledge. One consequence is that educational researchers need to be informed of 
the potential dangers in generating empirically-grounded claims without recognising 
the problems originating in such things as theory-laden perception, the complexity of 
induction, the over- or under-determination of claims from evidence, the social 
nature of research, the perspectival relativity of reason, and so on (see Johnson, 
2009). Such issues often originate in the humanities and in broader fields of social 
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science that raise complex questions concerning epistemology, ontology, axiological 
and the role of theory. Despite this complexity, these intricacies are poorly 
represented at the undergraduate level where the default assumption is too often 
unproblematised empiricism.  
 
Humeanism is a philosophical approach that renders empiricism the only sure source 
of knowledge in which values are set adrift or subjectivised as unverifiable. Hume was 
clear that all the ‘material of thinking’ was drawn from sense experience and that all 
our ideas, or ‘feeble perceptions’ as he called them, were mere ‘copies of our 
impressions of more lively ones’ (Hume, 1996: 15). These were derived from 
‘outward’ sensations, or sense experiences, that were then subjected to reasoning or 
‘inward sentiment’ (ibid. p.15). For Hume there was no other source of knowledge, for 
while metaphysicians may lay claim to complex ideas of ultimate ‘original principles’ 
they did so without acknowledging their attachment to contingency and 
interpretation: 
 
But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, 
upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, 
and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the 
faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the 
materials afforded us by the senses and experience. (ibid. p.14) 
 
Hume’s empiricism came to imply that reliable knowledge could only be gained from 
observable evidence where issues of replication, the prospect of verification, the use 
of instrumentation for accuracy and detail, and so on, were deemed integral to the 
process. 
 
One of the limitations of Hume’s empiricism is that it deforms by marginalising 
issues of value. His concern for the limits of human thinking and for the necessity of 
epistemological modesty was based on the assumption that ‘Reason is, and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to 
serve and obey them’ (Hume, 1973: 458). Because ‘reason is perfectly inert’ (ibid. 
p.458), a mere tool or purposeless instrument, and non-cognitive passions (emotions, 
beliefs, values) a-rational, Hume is renowned for his declaration: ‘Tis not contrary to 
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reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger’ 
(ibid. p.416). Some have argued, however, that such a view of reason is 
philosophically untenable precisely because it omits an explicit conception of what is 
right, just or valued. We can only give a flavour of their argument here, but 
philosophers like Korsgaard and Hampton would claim that Hume’s view of 
reasoning is unreflective of its value assumptions and is ‘as hip-deep in normativity 
as any moral theory, and therefore just as metaphysically problematic’ (Hampton, 
1998: 206. See also Hampton, 1996; Korsgaard, 1997. See Gibson, 2011 for a longer 
exegesis of Hampton and Korsgaard’s arguments). For some, Humean empiricism 
emerges as a conservative political philosophy insofar as it arrives at a position of 
‘righteous contentment’ with the way things are by distorting practical engagement 
with reality (Marcuse, 1972: 141). It is something Hume may well have acknowledged, 
for at the start of the Enquiry he concedes that his philosophical arguments bore no 
‘direct reference to action and society’ (Hume, 1996: 9). Our point is that Hume’s 
persistent scepticism regarding the remit of human reasoning prevented him from 
making logical connections between his philosophical empiricism and the values that 
emerged in his writings on social, political and economic matters. As a conservative, 
these were reducible to matters of personal passion and social custom, where 
scratching a finger or the world’s destruction were considered epistemologically 
equivalent.  
 
Two centuries later this predilection in British empiricism became even more 
crystallised and distorted with Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic ([1936] 1971). In it 
he argued that all propositions were either analytic, that is to say axiomatically true 
by virtue of their meaning as in mathematical or logical statements, or, in keeping 
with Hume, susceptible to the principle of verification. Verification concerning 
propositions about the world were either ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ but were possible only by 
means of empirical enquiry (ibid., p. 178-9). Values, in contrast, were cast adrift as 
‘emotive’, alien to the possibility of verification and without cognitive substance. In 
short, facts and values were categorically distinct. The former were verifiable through 
enquiry, as in scientific endeavour, but ‘statements of value’ were simply expressive of 
a person’s emotions or feelings and ‘unverifiable’ (ibid. p. 108):  
 
When such differences of opinion arise in connexion with an ordinary 
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empirical proposition, one may attempt to resolve them by referring to, or 
actually carrying out, some relevant empirical test. But with regard to ethical 
statements, there is, on the 'absolutist' or ‘intuitionist' theory, no relevant 
empirical test. We are therefore justified in saying that … ethical statements 
are held to be unverifiable. (ibid., p. 109 our emphasis) 
 
While Ayer tried to assure his reader that despite this fact-value dichotomy he was no 
advocate of ‘relativism’ or ‘subjectivism’ (Ayer, 1936, p. 107-9), he has been widely 
accused of a reductio ad absurdum by taking verification to a point of excess in 
maintaining that issues of value are meaningful only if verifiable (see Quine, 1953: 38 
on Ayer’s ‘radical reductionism’). We would argue that some of the deformities that 
emerge from empiricist epistemology resonate within dissertation advisory textbooks 
today. 
 
Bias in dissertation textbooks 
 
Many of the copious, reassuring textbooks for the neophyte educational researcher in 
England are biased in three ways. First, the taxonomies used to describe empirical 
research are insufficiently problematised and draw attention away from key 
philosophical quandaries. Second, that while non-empirical inquiry is often 
acknowledged it is then frequently selected out or marginalised as if it were 
inappropriate or too problematic for undergraduates to consider. And third, because 
of these underpinning complexities, often the solution to selecting a research 
approach is to oblige the student to make their ‘own personal choice’. We develop 
these themes in turn. 
 
The first problem is one of defining taxonomies and of the ensuing assumption that 
education research is either empiricist or interpretivist in nature. We acknowledge 
that advice for undergraduates will need to avoid some of the ontological and 
epistemological complexity of surrounding debates and that this will mean that it will 
sometimes be preferable to emphasise sharp distinctions rather than imply subtlety, 
perhaps especially in the choice of terminology used to label key choices. This, 
however, produces its own problems. ‘Qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ are frequently 
used to describe both research ‘methods’ and research ‘approaches’; ‘positivism’ and 
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‘interpretivism’ are twain that should never meet; ‘empiricism’ is often contrasted 
with ‘normative’ or philosophical investigation, and so on. Many textbooks, however, 
suggest that educational research must clearly fall into one or other of these camps 
(see Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). Many explain this necessity by constructing a 
bifurcating taxonomy. On the one hand is placed the empiricism of Locke, the 
‘paradigm of positivism’ (Thomas, 2013: 107) and connected in some way with the 
sociology of Comte that employs numbers and quantifiable data: 
 
Strictly speaking this (empiricism) means something that has been found out 
from experience, from trial and error or from the evidence of your senses. 
‘Empiricism’ is often wrongly used, though, with the intimation of experiment 
of some kind, so when people talk of ‘empirical evidence’ they usually 
(incorrectly) mean evidence coming from some kind of trial or experimental 
study. (Thomas, 2013: 22) 
 
This is then contrasted with the ‘paradigm of interpretivism’ that is equated with 
‘constructivism’ and said to emerge from Husserl’s phenomenology, where the quest 
was more one of finding explanative words by using the qualities of ‘narrative’ rather 
than ‘cause’. It is a dualistic taxonomy common in many English textbooks (and from 
evidence above elsewhere) that makes a clear distinction between the two realms of 
empiricism or interpretivism. However, from the perspective of a student one might 
anticipate a problem of perception about how they would then view their proposed 
teacher interviews (say) as either ‘empirical’ or ‘interpretive’. Thomas acknowledges 
that the bifurcation ‘is something of an oversimplification’ and warns his reader 
about ‘not getting trapped in a mind-set that says that we have to be either positivist 
or interpretivist’ (ibid., 113). But, because a divide has been made, it must inevitably 
encourage the student to think in terms of opting for a polarised choice, despite the 
complexity about the sort of knowledge her planned interviews (in this case) may 
yield. 
 
Pring has argued that the problem originates with a taxonomy that is too-rigid and is 
perpetuated by the language of bifurcation: ‘It is as though the Cartesian dualism has 
returned in a more subtle form to trap the unwary’ (Pring, 2005: 229. See also Pring, 
2000). His argument is that while ‘the scientific paradigm’ minimises the possibility 
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that it is the social world that decides how it ‘constructs’ (‘represents’ ‘values’ 
‘preferences’, ‘finances’) its enquiry, advocates of ‘interpretivism’ fight shy of truth 
claims while still implying much the same in declarations about their research being 
‘more sophisticated’, ‘more reasonable’, ‘appropriate’ or making the world ‘better 
informed’: 
 
Just as the social construction of the physical world depends upon a real 
world, independent of that construction and constraining what construction is 
possible, so the social construction of the personal and social world 
presupposes the independent existence of objects (persons) which can be 
described in terms of consciousness, rationality, intentionality, responsibility 
and feeling. The very ‘negotiation’ of meanings can be conducted only within a 
framework of shared meanings, (and these) meanings (in their most general 
state) are not open to negotiation. That is how the world is, independent of my 
construing it – and how it must be if I am to enter into negotiations with 
others. (ibid. 255) 
 
Unlike Thomas, who is evidently aware of but offers no solution to the young 
researcher of ‘getting trapped’ by dualism, Pring’s critique is directed towards the 
misplaced polarisation between empirical and interpretive research itself, where the 
former is less able to deliver the certainties originally demanded by the 
Enlightenment, the basis of post-foundational critiques, and the latter feigns coyness 
about the veracity of its value judgements.  
 
The marginalisation of non-empirical inquiry 
 
A second problem is that this distorting polarity is related to with the way in which 
textbooks often recommend that a student should choose to focus their dissertation 
on either ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ data (e.g. Bridges, 2011; Symonds & Gorard, 2010). 
This is presented as a requirement to opt for an ‘empirical study’ or a ‘desk study’ 
(University of Gloucestershire, 2014), a ‘field based enquiry’ or a ‘document based 
enquiry’ (Bath Spa University, 2012), that sequester fundamental weaknesses of 
conception and mirror the problem of epistemological dualism outlined above.  
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First: Even as a surface phenomenon such a bifurcation is descriptively problematic 
for a ‘document based enquiry’ (‘library study’, ‘review of literature’ ‘theoretical 
study’) is always also a requirement of the ‘empirical’ or ‘field-based enquiry’. 
Moreover - and for the sake of humour - one would imagine that all students who 
opted to write an empirical study would at some point sit at a desk. Our point is that 
such surface descriptions belie deeper problems of trying to account for the 
generation and interpretation of primary/secondary data in educational research.  
 
Second: The problem of ‘interpreting’ secondary data is clear from Walliman and 
Buckler’s observation that ‘secondary data are data that have been interpreted and 
recorded’ (2008: 145). Presented in such a way, it would seem to provide the 
researcher with empirical evidence of that which has already been validated in some 
way. What makes this questionable is how the process of ‘interpretation’ becomes 
opaque or invisible to the secondary user, who then fills their ‘literature review’ with 
it. Advice and discussion regarding the complexity of ‘interpretation’ is too often 
muted in such textbooks in favour of a presumption of previously recorded and 
reified given-ness. If ‘interpretation’ is enmeshed within ‘secondary data’ we would 
argue that such advice to undergraduate students would need to prepare them more 
adequately for the fundamental and complex task of selecting and re-interpreting, 
contra re-presenting, this material as canonical empirical evidence, and we build on 
this in our final section on argument.  
 
Third: Perhaps more importantly, there is a clear preference in much of the 
commercially published advice for undergraduates to gather ‘primary data’ while 
nodding at the possibility of other types of ‘desk’ or ‘literature’ study, and this 
underpins our thesis of tacit empiricism. O’Hara et al. (2011) state: 
 
For some the dissertation may be philosophical, theoretical or be largely based 
on archive or documentary data of various kinds. However for many students 
on education and related courses, the dissertation may also involve a strong 
practical dimension involving social experiments of primary data collection in 
the field. (O’Hara et al., 2011: 2-3) 
 
Similarly, the quotation that heads this paper includes the probability that a research 
11 
project ‘will be empirical’, that ‘you will be expected to go out into the wide world and 
collect data yourself rather than relying on information marshalled by others – for 
example in a book’ (Thomas, 2013: 20-2). It counsels that ‘a research project that is 
based solely on the literature’ (ibid: 22) is a possibility, but presents it as if it were 
‘unusual’ and thus a potential hindrance. The implication is clear, that unless a 
student wishes to be perceived as atypical, their study should generate ‘primary data’ 
(via interviews, observations and other empirical methods) for which copious advice 
is given. However, even if the advice is empirically accurate regarding its empirical 
preferences (and this is questionable - see the University of Winchester below), there 
is no attempt to resist or counter the assumption. While it is acknowledged that an 
undergraduate dissertation could draw solely ‘on information marshalled by others’, 
its feasibility is dismissed by quite literally bracketing out this possibility: ‘(In fact, a 
research project as a literature review – that is, just as a literature review – is 
sometimes acceptable, but if you want to do a research project that is based solely on 
the literature you should check with your tutor)’ (Thomas, 2013: 22). In such a way 
‘just a literature review’ is marginalised and relegated as an option, and a student 
who may choose to approach enquiry of this sort remains unsupported (certainly in 
this advice) while non-empirical enquiry is misrepresented and side-lined.  
 
Furthermore, such advice is not only philosophically dubious but is possibly 
empirically inaccurate. Some universities in England do indeed seem to demand 
empirical enquiry while others veto it. At Bath Spa, the Education Studies 
undergraduate dissertation handbook stipulated (until recently) that ‘The ED6001 
enquiry should be empirical in nature’ and so appeared as mandatory (Bath Spa, 
2012: 4). At the University of Gloucestershire, as at Göttingen and Waikato, 
empiricism appears a possibility inasmuch as students are required to opt for an 
‘empirical investigation’ (‘where there is an emphasis on collection, interpretation, 
analysis and evaluation of primary data during the active learning experience’) or a 
‘desk study’ (‘where there is an emphasis on a wide range of, and careful synthesis 
and critical evaluation of the source material’) (Gloucestershire, 2015). However, in 
Education Studies at the University of Winchester empirical enquiry is effectively 
proscribed: 
 
Education Studies dissertations are not normally empirical because such work 
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does not easily enable students to achieve the Level 3 Learning Outcomes for 
Education Studies. If you are considering empirical research it is essential that 
you inform a tutor at the very beginning of the proposal process. If, after 
critical discussion you are allowed to design some small-scale empirical 
research, then you must also undertake additional research training and 
ethical scrutiny before embarking on any data collection. Failure to do this will 
result in a failed dissertation. (University of Winchester, 2015) 
 
The marginalisation of that which is not empirical (grouped under categories like ‘the 
extended literature review’, ‘documentary data’, the ‘philosophical’) is evident also in 
the selection and recommendation of preferred types of research methods. Sharp, for 
example, suggests a ‘taxonomy’ of ‘research paradigms’ that he refers to variously as 
‘kinds’ or ‘types’ (Sharp, 2010: 45-56. See also Burton et al. 2008; Walliman & 
Buckler, 2008: 150): 
 
● surveys  
● experimental  
● case studies  
● action research  
● documentary research  
● ethnographic 
● phenomenological  
● grounded theory 
 
He suggests: ‘The likelihood is that your work, either by design or by accident, will 
naturally align itself with one of the first of the five’ (Sharp, 2010: 45). Leaving aside 
the crude account of the ‘accidental’ or ‘natural’ description of research design, that 
provides further evidence of the empiricist’s scotoma, along with the unexplained 
demonization of ethnography, phenomenology study and grounded theory that are 
positioned hierarchically beneath the preeminent five, the fifth validated possibility is 
‘documentary research’. However, in subsequent discussion of the various five ‘likely’ 
possibilities, documentary research goes unheeded. No information or advice is given 
to describes the procedures and possibilities of carrying out such an activity nor, 
indeed, whether policy-critique through published documentation is implied by the 
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term. This contrasts quite explicitly with the first four ‘types’ that are given lengthy 
synopses and practical advice. In other words, ‘documentary research’ (or ‘secondary 
data’ in Walliman and Buckler’s terms) is mentioned as an option, but then 
overlooked and effectively proscribed. In short, it is an example of taxonomic 
selection that marginalises that which is deemed ‘uncommon’ while advancing 
empirical options uncritically, and, in so doing, avoids questioning in what way 
‘documentary research’ might itself be considered empirical. 
 
Similarly, non-empirical research is selected out and marginalised through ‘example 
material’ used to illustrate what practical choices a student will need to make in the 
formulation of their research proposal. For example: 
 
Let’s imagine that you are interested in hospital education services for children 
who are chronically sick. You could pose questions such as the following: 
1. How many children are educated in hospitals in England, how have trends 
changed in post-war years and what are the possible reasons for this? 
2. What is the experience of children educated in hospital today? 
3. What are attitudes to hospital-educated children when they return to 
school? 
4. If a rest period is introduced into the hospital school day at mid-morning, 
what will be the consequence on children’s lunchtime behaviour?  
 
(Thomas, 2013: 125. See also Walliman & Buckler on the possible options of 
‘research into children’s playground in cities’, 2008: 165) 
 
Question 1, says Thomas, ‘is unequivocally concerned with description and 
descriptive statistics’. Question 2 ‘leads you to examine children’s experience’ and 
methods of ‘observing the experience of children’ or ‘asking the children or parents 
themselves’. Question 3 leads to a consideration of attitudes that could be researched 
by ‘interviewing individual children’ or ‘by giving a questionnaire to children’. 
Question 4 ‘involves some kind of assessment of consequence: What happens when?’ 
And thus, ‘particular kinds of question lead to particular kinds of study’ (Thomas, 
2013: 93 our emphasis). But the earlier suggestion that ‘just a literature review’ is 
feasible is in effect ignored, that one might choose, for example, to make judgements 
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about whether children ought to be educated in hospitals at all or what is implied by 
education in such contexts. Our concern is that if an enduring problem in empirical 
research is accounting adequately for axiological issues, then what emerges is the 
likelihood that the empirical dissertation is currently fabricated to duplicate this 
inadequacy, and, by tacit and biased  selection, education research is reduced 
(although some might think elevated) to a social science. Levin (2005: 51), for 
example, talks consistently of education as if were a branch of ‘social science’ and 
Thomas includes eighteen references to the term (Thomas, 2013) but refers not once 
to the possibility that it may be also part of the humanities. 
 
The subjectivising of choice 
 
The third issue is that one way out of this complex weave is to individualise a 
student’s selection of research method as if it were a consumptive item. Greetham, for 
example, describes the kind of student attracted to the ‘empirical approach’ and in so 
doing casts it as a personal preference or a psychological disposition: 
 
Empirical Approach: … you may be the type of person who likes to meet and 
talk to people and would be quite happy persuading them to be part of the 
research project by completing a questionnaire or agreeing to be interviewed… 
You will have to ask where your abilities lie, so that you can ensure your 
project draws mainly on one or a blend of abilities in which you’re strongest. 
Use the following checklist of questions to get the blend right. Give yourself a 
score out of ten for each ability. (Greetham , 2009: 35 & 37 our emphasis) 
 
Having explained the simplistic bifurcation between positivism and interpretivism 
that we have criticised above, Walliman and Buckler similarly suggest:  
 
You will need to think about this. Your own personal philosophy about how 
we can see and understand the world around us will be a fundamental factor in 
your attitude to your investigations. (Walliman & Buckler, 2008: 164-5 our 
emphasis) 
 
The philosophical quandaries mentioned in our introduction, about the tough 
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ongoing debates about entrenched research dogmas, are here reduced to ‘personal’ 
choices and ‘attitudinal’ issues that students must face, but who remain quite possibly 
unaware that such a selection embeds deep epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. In the appeal to the personal there is sequestered a passive model of 
‘personality’ that denies the interested nature of knowledge production, such that 
issues associated with political and moral judgements about the world are 
marginalised. (Below we develop this stance via the reduction of ethics to a technical 
requirement for ‘effective study’, rather than an explicit quest for ‘transformative 
paradigms’). 
 
To sum up so far: we have questioned the nature of dualism in educational research; 
the marginalisation of non-empirical enquiry through the assumption of a 
questionable dualistic taxonomy; the preference for primary data and exemplary 
materials that distort the meaning of interpretation; the perception and presentation 
of education as if were (only) a social science; and the appeal to personal choice 
rather than epistemological validation. We have argued that these are some of the 
ways in which tacit empiricism is advanced in dissertation textbooks and have 
suggested that much of this legacy can be attributable to British empiricism. 
 
Instrumentalism, ethics and value 
 
British empiricism lingers in advice given to students today in the way it separates 
the instrument of reasoning from the purpose for reasoning. This mirrors, we 
suggest, Hume’s portrayal of reason as ‘useful but blind’ (McGuigan, 2006: 171). 
Because reason is here conceived a tool that discovers the best action to achieve a 
subject’s passions, underpinned by a profound scepticism towards the possibility of 
reason deliberating upon those purposes and values, some have argued that 
‘“Humean” now serves as a virtual synonym for “instrumentalist”’ (Setiya, 2004: 365. 
See also Audi, 2002: 236; Horkheimer, 2004: 3). This is clearly redolent of 
dissertation advice that would align empiricism with the dispersal of values and 
ethical judgements to individual students who are then required to consider ‘their 
own personal philosophy’ or ‘subjective choices’ about their research preferences.  
 
This licence, however, is clearly not granted to students when they engage in the 
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processes of primary data collection during empirical research. Here dissertation 
advice on appropriate ethical behaviour is bountiful and robust. Walliman and 
Buckler (2008), for example, devote a chapter to What’s All This About Ethics?  
 
Ethics is about moral principles and rules of conduct… they focus on your 
behaviour towards other people and their work. It is therefore important to 
avoid unfairly usurping other people’s work and knowledge, invading their 
privacy or hurting their feelings. (ibid. p.30) 
 
They explain how a research proposal will often require the student to complete their 
institution’s ‘ethics form’ (ibid. p.32) that helps focus attention on questions of 
consent and permission, the risk to participants, and dealing with issues of a 
‘confidential and sensitive data’ (ibid. p.32). Burton et al. (2008) likewise suggest: 
 
Teachers and researcher share one common responsibility, namely ‘duty of 
care’ in relations to all those participating in the research process. Behaving in 
an ethical manner will also increase the chances of maintaining positive 
relationships between researcher and participants for the duration of the 
study. (p.50) 
 
Putting aside the assumption that research will involve ‘participants’ - that supports 
our argument of the clandestine preference for the collection of primary data and 
empiricism - ‘ethics’ here concerns merely the behaviour of people in interpersonal 
interaction. Similarly, given the empirical preferences of Thomas, it is unsurprising 
that he devotes a lengthy chapter to ‘Project Management, ethics and getting 
clearance’ (Thomas, 2013: 28-56), that also offers advice to students when ‘gaining 
consent’, seeking ‘access’ to participants and completing the requisite ethics 
procedure form. He concludes: ‘However, ethics will not be a matter of concern if 
you are looking at matters that do not involve individual people - such as policy issues 
of data that is in the public domain’ (ibid. p.41 our emphasis). 
 
We believe the advice is ill-conceived. The idea that ethical considerations are of ‘no 
concern’ in judgements concerning ‘policy issues’ seems to us profoundly misguided 
and illustrative of instrumentalism in that it reduces ethical concerns to issues of 
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politeness and appropriateness during processes of personal interaction. We do not 
deny the importance of care in dealing with others when carrying out empirical 
research. However, we do question the assumption that ethics in educational research 
is reducible to interpersonal issues and notions of confidentiality and care. We have 
attributed this to a legacy of British empiricism that casts values as emotive, 
dependent upon individual passion and deemed un-guidable by reason and 
argument. While for Hume, as we have seen, ‘Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger’ (Hume, 1976: 416), for 
Marcuse, as a Jew who escape the holocaust in a terse denial of English empiricism, 
declared that ‘the real empirical world is still that of the gas chambers and 
concentration camps’ (Marcuse, 1972: 147). His point is that empiricism deals 
inadequately with the broader political and social backdrop to value judgements, or 
appears relaxed or incapable of dealing with issue of what ought to be.  
 
What ought to be is ultimately unavoidable in educational enquiry: 
 
The importance of finding answers to some empirical questions in education is 
clear. Empiricism, however, involves the idea that our only access to 
understanding is through the gathering of evidence or data. In fact, what is to 
count as evidence or data already presupposes non-empirical considerations of 
some kind, and there are a great many questions—including the most 
important questions for education—that cannot be settled in this way: for 
example, epistemological, ethical and metaphysical questions. It is a 
characteristic of questions of this kind that they are not amenable to definitive 
resolution. Yet, in enquiry into education they are unavoidable. (Standish, 
2007, p.161) 
 
Take, suggests Standish, a student wishing to focus their dissertation on the subject 
of ‘educational achievement and poverty’. They will, quite probably, need to concern 
themselves with ‘facts’, like data on free school meals, that will need rigorous 
‘interpretation’. They may also have come to the decision to interview, for example, a 
Headteacher in order to understand the perspective of a school manager, and so will 
need to plan appropriately for the ethical challenges that this will involve. However, 
says Standish, sooner or later ‘someone somewhere will need to face up to the 
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question of what ought to be done’, to look at the broader ethical considerations that 
become ‘at some point unavoidable’ (Standish, 2010: 8, 7). While reductionists would 
advocate that human reason was incapable of coming to convincing judgements 
about such matters, others would claim that reasoned argument about ethical 
propositions is an essential, connected and yet a rarely developed or explicitly taught 
preparation for undergraduate dissertation writing. We have argued that this is 
implicit in the reduction of ethics to an instrument of empirical research, but it raises 
much deeper issues concerning the purpose of writing a dissertation that we have no 
space here to develop.  
 
Here the ubiquitous Research Ethics Approval Form that dissertation students are 
often required to negotiate and sign is of relevance. While assiduous in its quest to 
assure that such things as interviewees’ anonymity is preserved, we would argue that 
it is a juridified instrument concerned merely with the technical-politeness aspects of 
interviewing or the preservation of delicate information post hoc. There is no 
comparative ‘approval form’ to indicate to a tutor whether a student realises what 
normative or ideological platform their dissertation is set upon, nor what ethical or 
political issues the study seeks to identify or attempts to elucidate, nor, indeed, 
whether there is the will to declare how it would seek to make the world a better 
place. These broader purposes are also of ethical concern. (See, for example, 
Fairclough who advocates that the research method called Critical Discourse Analysis 
should originate from the identification of ‘a social wrong’: Fairclough, 2009: 167. 
Similarly, but from very a different tradition, see Koopman, 2009, who argues for 
educational inquiry as a ‘meliorist transition’). 
 
Teaching argumentation as a prelude to research methods 
 
We arrive at a position in which, while a preference for tea or coffee may well be 
deemed a personal decision, the idea that weighty questions of value that underpin 
education are ultimately subjective is problematic. To use Standish’s example above, 
concerning whether educational provision ought to compensate for poverty, the only 
way of answering it is to elevate it to a matter of public debate so it becomes part of a 
discourse where values and judgements are open to contestation and, in principle, 
refutable. A century ago Mill had argued: 
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There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, 
because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and 
assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete 
liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which 
justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action: and on no other terms 
can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. 
(Mill, 1969, p. 145) 
 
There is, in other words, no test for the adequacy of a claim to truth other than the 
force of better public argument: ‘The steady habit of correcting and completing his 
own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and 
hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance 
on it’ (ibid. p. 146). While Mill deals inadequately with the social power of contenders 
(see Gibson, 2009), the point that judgement in such matters is not mere whimsy or 
personal but part of the social and political fabric is key, and underpins Pring’s 
accusation of unfounded dualism. Moreover, the Quality Assurance Agency’s 
guidelines for Education Studies in England clearly place these philosophical 
assumptions about the need for argumentation at the heart of the undergraduate 
programme that climaxes in the final-year dissertation: 
 
2.4 Graduates are able to participate in and contest changing discourses 
exemplified by reference to debate about values, personal and social 
engagement, and how these relate to communities and societies. Students have 
opportunities to develop their critical capabilities through the selection, 
analysis and synthesis of relevant perspectives, and to be able to justify 
different positions on educational matters.     
4.1 All programmes in education studies will [...] 
encourage students to engage with fundamental questions concerning the 
aims and values of education and its relationship to society [...] 
develop in students the ability to construct and sustain a reasoned 
argument; 
5.7 […] construct and communicate oral and written arguments. 
7.7 On graduating with an honours degree in education studies, students 
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should be able to organise and articulate opinions and arguments in speech 
and writing using relevant specialist vocabulary. 
 
(QAA, 2007 our emphasis) 
 
How Education Studies undergraduates might acquire the attributes of 
argumentation is less clear, but we proffer suggestions. Burke conceptualises its role 
within academic communities by means of a conversational metaphor, likening it to a 
crowded room where a dialogue between experts has been going on for some time 
before the advent of new arrivals (see McMillen & Hill, 2005, p. 6-7). As doctoral 
students enter they begin to make valid contributions to specific conversations; 
masters’ students initiate plausible but hesitant offerings; and undergraduates, to a 
greater or lesser degree, report on conversations they have already heard. In short, 
undergraduates need to know where they are in terms of the broader web of existing 
arguments before they can start to question received wisdom. Much of this growing 
awareness of how arguments work and of their content within specific academic 
fields is learnt inductively by students entering exchanges in tutorials, seminars and 
assignments throughout the period of their degree. Arguably, it could also be taught 
deductively through explicit attention to formal logic and syllogistic reasoning, 
although we are unaware of its inclusion in any Educational Studies programme in 
England. The limitation of the inductive approach is that it too readily becomes 
subordinate to the subject matter that forms the focus of the teaching or assessment, 
while deductive argument is not only rare but is easily dismissed as sterile or 
irrelevant (see Nussbaum, 2011).  
 
For these reasons we would suggest that undergraduates should be taught about 
argumentation explicitly before they begin their research. Given its philosophical 
prescience within the subject benchmarks for Education Studies, and the limitations 
associated with inductive or incidental approaches to achieving these ends, we would 
suggest that students need an explicit and scaffolded introduction to the processes 
and structure of argument. Many models exist to which we cannot do justice here (see 
Andrews, 2010), but from what has been said previously we favour not the form of 
argument that would attend merely to syllogistic reasoning and the rigours of 
premise and logic, but what Walton (2007), Nussbaum (2011) and others describe as 
21 
argument as a process that emerges from dialectical engagement. Toulmin’s model of 
argument (Toulmin, 1958/2008), originally devised as an attack on the limitations of 
formal logic where values and truth claims were said to be sequestered beneath 
seemingly valid syllogisms, is one we have used successfully with students in our own 
institution. The model posits six aspects. Its core structure consists of a claim, with 
grounds and warrants that back it, while around the periphery are staged concerns 
that involve the possibility of rebuttal, scoping and backing. For undergraduates we 
would suggest that the claim they make in their title and introduction should be read 
as a claim for understanding. Recalling the conversational metaphor, a successful 
claim would thus report an on-going situation represented in research literature with 
greater or lesser sophistication expressed through a claimed scope. The grounds 
(‘facts’ ‘data’ ‘empirical’ evidences) that they may draw upon would be judged for 
their credibility according to their place in the academic discourse and method of 
their generation.  
 
This would then open up what is being claimed as credible evidence in an argument. 
Some grounds may well be generated empirically through the usual methods, but 
others will be arrived at by way of axiological inquiry. Hart, for example, suggests that 
‘claims of fact’ are ‘statements that can be proven to be true or false’ (Hart, 2002, p. 
90) and are thus reminiscent of Hume and Ayer’s principle of verification. Equally, a 
student may be persuaded to make a claim of value (a ‘judgement about the worth of 
something’), a claim of policy (a ‘normative statement about what ought to be done’), 
or a claim of interpretation (‘about proposals on how some data or evidence are to be 
understood’) (ibid., p. 90). Credible arguments would link what is being claimed with 
the facts of the matter, and this is the role of the warrant. Toulmin’s model thus not 
only makes it possible to make useful distinctions between the qualities of arguments 
but, by implication, between different assessment grades that might be supported by 
the sophistication of a scoped claim, the quality of the grounds and how, in the 
warrant, there is an incisive rebuttal of alternative interpretations of the evidence. On 
the key issue of rebuttal, or in Mill’s terms of knowing from whence your enemy may 
come, Kaufer and Geisler’s model of argument is valuable in getting students to 
identity their claim, or a series of cumulative and directional claims, that will form 
what they call the arguer’s ‘main path’. ‘Faulty claims’ are those that fall outside their 
perspective, but which must be known and dealt with, while ‘return paths’ are those 
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where the student will summarise ‘what lessons they will take with them from the 
rejected position to incorporate into their own’ and so ‘help readers see the 
limitations in faulty-path claims’ and return them from these paths ‘putting them 
securely back on course’ (Kaufer & Geisler, 1991, p. 117-8).  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued not against empirical methods in the undergraduate dissertation but 
for its pre-eminence to be questioned, its tendency towards epistemological 
empiricism, and for its relocation within a broader framework that would enhance 
explicit attention to values that avoided reductive social scientism. We have argued 
that students need to be made aware of the tendency in empiricism to generate 
reductionist accounts and set them over and above normative enquiry, a procedure in 
which ethical considerations become reducible to mere technical-instrumental 
concerns. We have also suggested that this would require a broader framework 
associated with models of argument that would enable a writer to move beyond the 
fact-value dichotomy and focus on a claim that may be normative in nature. While we 
have recommended Toulmin’s model, for it provides clarity for understanding the 
genre of argumentation, its limitation is that it avoids epistemology and thus needs 
allying with a critical or pragmatic understanding of the central importance of a claim 
to truth as a commitment to future action. We have therefore suggested that 
argument should become used as a purposeful instrument, employed for the 
achievement of wider social goods and that argumentation in Education Studies 
programmes should explicitly advocate meliorism as an end-in-view, be it immediate 
or deferred (see Koopman, 2009). Following from this, we have implied that 
understanding the structure and purpose of argument should exist prior to any 
taught method of educational enquiry that would then become subsidiary and 
selected more purposely depending upon the claim a student was choosing to make. 
 
References 
 
Andrews, R. (2010) Argumentation in Higher Education: Improving Practice 
through Theory and Research. London, Routledge. 
Audi, R. (2002) Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean 
23 
instrumentalism and the normative authority of desire. International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 10 (3) 235–263. 
Ayer, A. J. (1936/1971) Language, Truth and Logic. London, Penguin. 
Bath Spa University (2012) ED6001: Education Dissertation Student Handbook. 
Bath, Newton Park. (Unpublished). 
Bell, J. (2005) Doing your Research Project. Maidenhead: OUP. 
Brown University (2015) Honors in Education Studies: Process for Writing a Senior 
Thesis. Available online at: 
http://www.brown.edu/academics/education/undergraduate/honors/honors-
education-studies (accessed 20 May 2015). 
Bridges, D. (2011) From the Scientistic to the Humanistic in the Construction of 
Contemporary Educational Knowledge. European Educational Research Journal 10 
(3) 304-321. 
Burton, N., Brundrett, M. & Jones, M. (2008) Doing Your Education Research 
Project. London, Sage. 
Davidson, D (2003) “Quine’s externalism”, in Glock, H.-J., Glüer, K., & Keil, G. (eds.) 
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